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Rethinking India-West Relations in a Multipolar World

Updated: Jun 1

As the global order continues to shift from unipolar dominance to multipolar complexity, nations are reevaluating their strategic alignments and international partnerships. At the heart of this evolving landscape lies India a civilizational democracy and emerging power poised to play a pivotal role in shaping the 21st-century geopolitical narrative.



In this exclusive interview with EconomicDiplomacy.in, Dr. Konstantinos Tsetsos, a respected geopolitical analyst and expert in EU-India relations shares his incisive views on how India and Western democracies can recalibrate their partnership for a new era.


How can India and Western powers redefine their partnership to reflect the realities of a multipolar world without reverting to Cold War-style bloc politics?

To adapt to a multipolar world without descending into bloc politics, India and Western powers must reframe their relationship as a strategic convergence of civilizational democracies rather than an alliance of convenience against a specific adversary like China. The West - and especially the US and the EU - should recognize India as a security actor in its own right, not as a counterweight.

On the hard security issues, this means enhancing interoperability between Indian and Western forces, expanding joint military exercises (like EU participation in Indian Ocean naval drills), and fostering military-to-military dialogues on non-traditional threats, such as cyberwarfare, hybrid threats, and maritime terrorism. Such cooperative approaches can be increased both on the EU as well as the bilateral level. Security partnerships must be grounded in shared threat perceptions, such as ensuring freedom of navigation, countering state-sponsored cyber or hybrid aggression, and protecting critical infrastructure and not be a mere coalition likeminded nations vis-a-vis Chinese expansion. By avoiding exclusive bloc logic and building trust-based security cooperation, India and the West can be the architects of a multipolar but stable order, rather than reactive players in emerging great-power rivalries.

From an EU perspective, the 21st century will witness the disproportionate rise of India—a geopolitical transformation that, in many ways, will replicate the earlier ascent of China, but with fundamentally different values and implications. As the world's largest democracy, India is not only a demographic and economic powerhouse. It is also a designated strategic partner of the West, offering a critical opportunity to shape the emerging multipolar order through shared democratic principles, rule-based cooperation, and mutual security interests. Unlike China's rise, which has challenged the liberal international system, India’s emergence as a great power provides the EU and its allies with a like-minded partner to reinforce global stability, foster inclusive governance, and build resilient supply chains and secure technological ecosystems.


In what ways can India and the West collaborate on reforming global institutions like the UN, WTO, and IMF to better represent emerging powers while maintaining global stability?

Global institutional reform must be integrally linked to strategic security inclusivity. For example, India's inclusion as a permanent UN Security Council member would not be merely symbolic but would reflect as a recognition of shifts in global power distribution and enhance the legitimacy of collective security mechanisms. The EU, particularly France and Germany, should strongly back India’s case, recognizing that roles in global peacekeeping, crisis management, and sanctions regimes must align with current geopolitical realities. In the WTO and IMF, reforms should also include security clauses that reflect emerging economic threats such as weaponized interdependence, strategic export controls, and supply chain resilience. A stronger India-West axis within these institutions can counterbalance coercive economic tools utilized by authoritarian powers. More broadly, the EU and India can institutionalize security coordination in multilateral bodies, especially on counterterrorism, disinformation resilience, and dual-use technology governance, offering a non-hegemonic security framework that is inclusive and stabilizing.

To summarize, in the WTO, both India and the Western powers can push for revitalizing dispute mechanisms and rebalancing trade norms to account for the developmental needs of emerging economies. In the IMF, quota reforms should reflect real GDP weights and contributions. India brings moral credibility as a democratic Global South leader, while the EU brings institutional influence – together, they can rebuild trust in multilateral systems as forums of fairness, not domination.

 

How can India and Western nations coordinate their Indo-Pacific strategies to ensure regional security and open sea lanes without provoking zero-sum rivalry with China?

Security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific must move from symbolic declarations to practical and scalable mechanisms. India and the West should invest in maritime domain awareness (MDA) networks, shared intelligence platforms, and interoperable patrol missions that support freedom of navigation without antagonizing China unnecessarily. They could however curb the abilities of on non-compliant actors such as Iran, Yemen or Pakistan.

The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific already aligns well with India's Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) doctrine. Operationalizing this alignment through joint naval deployments, port infrastructure protection, and logistics support agreements (such as the EU exploring reciprocal access to Indian naval facilities) would lend deeper meaning to these strategies. Importantly, regional security architecture should remain open and ASEAN-centric, avoiding an overt “anti-China” identity. India and the West can lead efforts to design multilateral crisis response mechanisms, early warning systems, and rules of engagement protocols that mitigate and de-escalate tensions – especially in flashpoints like the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait. India-EU ties should focus on deterrence through cooperation, not containment through confrontation.

 

What opportunities exist for India and the West to jointly shape global technology governance - such as AI regulation, digital trade, and data privacy - amid competing standards from authoritarian powers?

Technology governance is not just about regulation; it is about security, digital sovereignty, and geopolitical influence. The rise of authoritarian digital ecosystems has shown how tech standards can be weaponized to enable surveillance, coercion, and cognitive warfare. India and the West must lead in developing secure, transparent, and democratic tech architectures. Joint initiatives could include cybersecurity standards for critical infrastructure; an EU-US-India AI ethics framework as a global reference point or a secure semiconductor supply chain coalition.

In forums like the Global Partnership on AI (GPAI), the G20, and future UN-led tech governance structures, India, the US, and the EU can push back against digital authoritarianism by championing a human-centric model of tech security, especially in areas like biometric surveillance, cross-border data flows, and quantum communication. A joint leadership would not only defend democratic tech spaces but also strengthen cyber deterrence and resilience in an era where information and influence operations are redefining national security.

If democracies fail to confine the unregulated use of AI by autocratic regimes, they risk enabling a global environment where cognitive warfare, disinformation, and algorithmic manipulation erode public trust and democratic cohesion from within. This could lead not only to ochlocratic governance – where popular mob sentiment dominates and ultimately overrides rational policymaking - but also to the normalization of dystopian surveillance societies within the next 10 to 20 years. Without coordinated democratic guardrails, the digital future may be shaped by actors who view control, not freedom, as the primary strategic asset. India and the EU, representing both technological capability and democratic diversity, must act swiftly and jointly to prevent such scenarios and to ensure that freedom, privacy, and accountability remain the defining principles of global tech governance.

 

How can India and Western democracies manage value-based disagreements (e.g., on human rights or democratic backsliding) while sustaining strategic cooperation on climate, energy, and defense in an increasingly fragmented world order?

Security cooperation should be compartmentalized where necessary, but not value-free. Disagreements on democracy or civil liberties must be addressed through institutionalized dialogues - such as EU-India strategic consultations - not through megaphone diplomacy. Simultaneously, climate and energy cooperation can be framed as security imperatives. For example, joint investments in green hydrogen and critical minerals can reduce strategic dependence on China while climate change adaptation strengthens societal resilience and prevents conflict escalation from resource stress.

On the matter of international security, India and Western nations can deepen arms collaboration, joint drills and exercises, co-develop dual-use technologies, and build trusted defense supply chains – independent of divergences on certain domestic issues. Indian armed forces personnel could join more EU and NATO training courses to enhance interoperability. For instance, European firms can engage with India under the Make in India and Atmanirbhar Bharat initiatives to enhance strategic autonomy on both sides, reducing dependency on volatile third-party actors. Political and economic disagreements are best managed on the basis of trust-based dialogue. Shared security interests can serve as the anchor during periods of normative friction – ensuring that strategic cooperation remains resilient even in turbulent political cycles. The establishment of such trust mechanisms and close cooperation will allow both the West and India to navigate and shape the turbulent waters of geopolitical rivalry in the 21st century.


Profile Dr. Konstantinos Tsetsos


Dr. Tsetsos is a distinguished political scientist and strategic analyst with extensive expertise in international relations, defense foresight, and geopolitical risk. With a career spanning academia, multilateral defense institutions, and high-level strategic consulting, Dr. Tsetsos brings a unique blend of scholarly depth and practical insight to his work on global security dynamics.


Dr. Tsetsos’s work spans key domains such as multipolar security architecture, Indo-Pacific strategies, democratic tech governance, and institutional reform. His expertise is regularly sought in EU and NATO policy circles, think tanks, and academic forums for his nuanced understanding of global power shifts and the future of democratic alliances.

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