The Dragon King Returns to the Land of Gods: Seven Years of Strategic Recalibration
Xi Jinping’s return to India after nearly seven years marks more than a diplomatic visit. Against the backdrop of the 2020 border crisis, BRICS and intensifying US-China competition, the meeting could signal a cautious recalibration of India-China relations.
By Samantha Karmakar
The return of Chinese President Xi Jinping to India after nearly seven years is not simply a revival of summit diplomacy; it is a carefully choreographed encounter between two powers whose relationship has been reshaped by mistrust, military friction, and the imperatives of an evolving Asian order.
From the informal symbolism of Mamallapuram in 2019 to the institutional grandeur of Bharat Mandapam, the journey captures the distance between diplomatic aspiration and strategic reality.
Mamallapuram represented an era in which personal chemistry between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Xi was expected to create political space for managing differences. That optimism was disrupted by the 2020 border crisis, which transformed the Line of Actual Control from a persistent dispute into the central barometer of bilateral trust. Since then, India–China relations have been defined less by the language of partnership and more by the grammar of caution.
Xi’s present arrival must therefore be interpreted not as a return to normalcy, but as an exercise in diplomatic recalibration. The objective is not to erase strategic differences, which remain substantial, but to prevent them from becoming permanently destabilising. In contemporary diplomacy, the restoration of communication is often not the evidence of trust; it is the mechanism through which trust may eventually become possible.
The BRICS platform adds another layer to this engagement. India and China remain strategic competitors, yet both are influential actors in the institutional imagination of the Global South. As BRICS seeks to project a more representative and plural global order, New Delhi’s stewardship offers an important diplomatic proposition: multilateral cooperation need not imply bilateral accommodation, and strategic autonomy need not exclude dialogue with competing powers.
For India, the diplomatic task is to combine strategic firmness with calibrated engagement. Border peace, respect for sovereignty, reciprocity
in economic relations, and the restoration of confidence must remain the foundation of any sustainable improvement. Dialogue can facilitate stability, but it cannot compensate for the absence of credible commitments.
For Beijing, improved ties with New Delhi carry their own strategic utility. At a time of intensifying US–China competition, shifting Indo-Pacific alignments, and economic uncertainty, a less confrontational relationship with India could preserve China’s strategic flexibility while reducing the risks of simultaneous geopolitical pressure.
The significance of Xi’s visit, then, lies not in the optics of reconciliation but in the possibility of institutionalising restraint. The relationship may not be moving towards harmony, but it may be moving towards a more predictable form of competition.
From Mamallapuram to Bharat Mandapam, the question is no longer whether India and China can recreate the warmth of the past. It is whether two civilisational powers can develop the diplomatic maturity to manage disagreement without allowing it to define the entirety of their relationship. That, ultimately, will determine whether this visit becomes a ceremonial pause—or the beginning of a more consequential strategic recalibration.
About the Author
Samantha Karmakar is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Delhi and an Independent Foreign Policy Analyst. A PhD scholar focusing on diplomatic affairs and strategic studies, she contributes policy commentary to major think tanks & research institutions like the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) , Her. Economy , and prominent newspapers, including Prabhat Khabar.
References
1. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 2nd India-China Informal Summit. October 12, 2019.
2. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. India-China Relations / Annual Report 2024.
3. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Indo-China Agreement on Border-Related Issues — Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 843. February 7, 2025.
4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Xi Jinping to Attend the 18th BRICS Summit in India. September 10, 2026.
5. Reuters. China, India arranging meeting for Xi, Modi, China's foreign ministry says. September 11, 2026.
6. The First Post .
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