India–Thailand Trade: From Bigger Trade to Better Trade
India and Thailand already possess the ingredients of a deeper economic relationship. They have historical familiarity, established corporate links, geographical proximity and a wider regional framework through ASEAN. What they now need is greater commercial balance and more sophisticated forms of engagement.

India and Thailand have spent centuries exchanging ideas, faith, art and people. Commerce is now trying to catch up with that older civilisational familiarity.
The trade ledger tells a story of two economies moving closer, though not yet with the same stride. India-Thailand bilateral trade rose from USD 11.39 billion in 2019 to a record USD 20.93 billion in 2025, an increase of nearly 84% in six years. Yet behind that impressive growth sits a harder number. India’s trade deficit with Thailand widened from USD 2.69 billion to USD 10.81 billion over the same period.
That imbalance gives new meaning to the recent meeting between Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal and Thailand’s Deputy Prime Minister and Commerce Minister Suphajee Suthumpun at Vanijya Bhawan in New Delhi. Their discussions covered trade and investment, market access, business-to-business engagement and the continuing review of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement, or AITIGA.
The timing is important because the relationship has reached a point where larger trade figures alone can no longer define success. India and Thailand now have to ask a more consequential question: what kind of trade do they want to build?
The Trade Ledger Is Growing, But So Is The Imbalance
India’s exports to Thailand include machinery, automobile components, pharmaceuticals, organic chemicals, precious stones, marine products and spices. Thailand, meanwhile, supplies India with vegetable oils, plastics, chemicals, machinery, electrical equipment, rubber products and precious metals.
There is nothing inherently unhealthy about a trade deficit. Economies import what they need, companies buy where they find competitive advantages, and bilateral trade rarely develops along perfectly symmetrical lines. The concern emerges when the gap becomes persistent while Indian businesses continue to face difficulties expanding their footprint in the partner market.
The numbers make that concern difficult to ignore. In 2025, India exported only USD 5.06 billion worth of goods to Thailand while importing USD 15.87 billion. The deficit therefore stood at roughly USD 10.81 billion, almost four times its 2019 level.
Thailand itself remains a significant partner within India’s wider trade architecture, although its relative weight is modest. It accounted for about 1.43% of India’s total international trade in FY2024-25, ranking 26th among India’s export destinations and 17th among its import sources. The objective, therefore, cannot simply be to keep pushing the headline number upward. The goal is to stop confusing volume with victory.
AITIGA Is Where The Bigger Argument Lies
The bilateral conversation also sits within a much larger debate over India’s economic relationship with ASEAN. India’s experience under AITIGA has produced a familiar concern. Since the agreement came into force in 2010, imports from ASEAN have grown considerably faster than Indian exports to the bloc. India’s exports to ASEAN rose from USD 26.63 billion in 2010-11 to around USD 44 billion in 2022-23, while imports climbed from USD 30.61 billion to USD 87.58 billion. In 2024-25, India exported roughly USD 39 billion to ASEAN against imports of about USD 84 billion.
For New Delhi, the question is about reciprocity. Regional integration works best when market access creates meaningful opportunities on both sides, rather than leaving domestic producers to absorb the adjustment while import channels deepen faster than export opportunities.
That is why the AITIGA review matters to Thailand even when the negotiations themselves are conducted at the ASEAN level. India has sought wider tariff liberalisation across the agreement while arguing that individual ASEAN members should offer meaningful access according to their economic circumstances. Government data cited in the discussions indicate that India had opened 71% of its tariff lines compared with 67% for Thailand.
These differences may appear technical on paper. For businesses, they can determine whether a product is competitive after duties, whether an investment makes commercial sense, and whether a company chooses to enter a market at all.
The larger message from New Delhi is becoming harder to miss. Regional integration must create pathways for Indian companies to compete abroad as confidently as foreign companies compete in India.
The Story Began Before Supply Chains Became Fashionable
India’s economic presence in Thailand also has a history that predates the current vocabulary of supply chains, connectivity and economic corridors. In 1965, when India’s overseas corporate presence was still limited, 25-year-old Aditya Vikram Birla established Indo-Thai Synthetics in Bangkok.
It became the first Indian company to set up a factory overseas. The decision was an early example of Indian capital looking beyond the domestic market and recognising Thailand as a place where manufacturing could grow.
Nearly six decades later, that pioneering presence has evolved into a much broader corporate ecosystem. Tata Steel Thailand and Tata Consultancy Services operate alongside companies such as L&T, Bajaj Auto, Royal Enfield, Tech Mahindra and the Aditya Birla Group.
That history matters because it shows that India-Thailand economic relations do not have to be invented from scratch. There is already commercial memory, institutional familiarity and a base of companies that have learned how to operate in each other’s markets. The next challenge is to widen that network.
The recent presence of a Thai business delegation representing areas such as space technology, cold-chain logistics, food processing, innovation, health and wellness, and trade promotion is therefore more significant than it may first appear. These are sectors where future trade can be built around capabilities and investment rather than simply the exchange of established commodities.
Cold-chain infrastructure can support agricultural trade. Food processing can shift commerce towards higher-value products. Technology partnerships can create new commercial links that did not exist when bilateral trade was dominated by more traditional goods. Here, the relationship can become more resilient. A diversified economic partnership gives companies more reasons to remain invested in one another’s markets even when individual sectors face disruption.
Thailand Is Also India’s Gateway Into A Larger Economic Space
There is another reason New Delhi cannot treat Thailand as simply another bilateral trading partner. Thailand sits at the intersection of India’s engagement with Southeast Asia. ASEAN accounted for about 11% of India’s global trade in 2024-25, with India-ASEAN trade reaching approximately USD 123 billion during the year. Thailand’s importance therefore extends beyond what appears in the bilateral trade column.
Stronger commercial links with Thailand can help Indian companies build relationships across Southeast Asian production networks. For Thai businesses, India offers access to one of the world’s largest and fastest-growing consumer and industrial markets.
The opportunity is particularly relevant as companies reassess supply chains, manufacturing locations and regional production strategies. India wants deeper economic integration with Southeast Asia, while Thailand has its own interest in expanding investment and commercial links with India. But integration will only remain politically sustainable if its benefits are visible to businesses on both sides.
The Real Test Will Begin Outside The Ministry
The language surrounding the latest ministerial meeting points towards market access, trade promotion, business networks and time-bound engagement. Those phrases matter only if they eventually translate into fewer barriers for companies trying to sell, invest or establish operations across the border.
The test will not be another declaration issued after a ministerial meeting. It will be whether an Indian manufacturer finds it easier to enter Thailand, whether a Thai company sees India as a commercially attractive production base, and whether businesses from both countries begin forming partnerships that survive beyond individual government initiatives.
That requires sustained institutional work. Tariff concerns need resolution, standards need greater compatibility, regulatory barriers need attention, and businesses need clearer channels for raising problems. Government-to-government diplomacy can open the door, but companies have to walk through it.
For India, this is especially important because the trade deficit has expanded far faster than the overall relationship. A growing economic partnership cannot remain politically comfortable if its gains appear concentrated on one side of the ledger.
The Next Billion Dollars Should Look Different
India and Thailand already possess the ingredients of a deeper economic relationship. They have historical familiarity, established corporate links, geographical proximity and a wider regional framework through ASEAN. What they now need is greater commercial balance and more sophisticated forms of engagement.
The record USD 20.93 billion in bilateral trade should therefore be treated as a milestone rather than a destination. The more interesting question is what the next USD 10 billion will contain.
The next billion dollars of India-Thailand trade cannot simply replicate the existing pattern. It must come from new investment, technology partnerships, manufacturing links and stronger business networks, while Indian exporters gain meaningful access to the Thai market and the bilateral deficit comes under greater pressure. If regional integration continues to expand without that balance, higher trade volumes alone will conceal a structural weakness rather than resolve it.
For decades, the relationship grew quietly through companies, communities and commercial pioneers who saw opportunity before governments gave it a formal vocabulary. Today, diplomacy has the chance to build the institutional architecture around that existing commercial instinct.
The objective is no longer simply bigger trade. It is better trade, measured in market access, business opportunity and value created on both sides. The next chapter of India-Thailand commerce will be written less by the size of the ledger than by what Indian and Thai businesses are able to do with it.





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