Tackling the New Frontiers of Terrorism: How the SCO Can Shape India's Eurasian Future

The SCO began as an effort to reduce tensions along the borders of a region unsettled by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Twenty-five years later, its members face threats that operate beyond territorial boundaries and demand a different kind of regional response.

A country cannot claim to be secure merely because its physical borders remain intact. Terrorist organisations operate through encrypted networks, digital financial channels and online platforms that connect individuals across continents.

Artificial intelligence has made this challenge more complicated by enabling sophisticated propaganda, targeted recruitment and the rapid circulation of extremist content. For national security agencies, threats can now emerge far beyond their territorial boundaries before their consequences are felt at home.

It is against this changing security environment that the first SCO Plus Expert Dialogue on Security Issues, held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, on November 6, 2026, assumes particular significance. Convened under the theme “Security in the Era of Digital Transformation: Countering Terrorism and Extremism in Light of Emerging Technologies,” the meeting brought together more than 180 representatives from 24 countries and five international organisations. Its 33 delegations examined the misuse of artificial intelligence and digital platforms for terrorist propaganda, recruitment and coordination. A Joint Communiqué outlined future cooperation in research, preventive practices and professional training.

For India, the significance of this initiative extends beyond participation in another multilateral forum. It offers New Delhi an additional platform to advance its longstanding concerns about cross-border terrorism, strengthen its relationships with Central Asian countries and contribute to the regional debate on emerging security threats. More importantly, it provides an opportunity to connect India’s immediate security priorities with its wider interests across Eurasia.

From Border Security to a Wider Eurasian Partnership

Understanding the importance of the SCO Plus initiative requires examining the organisation’s evolution. Its foundations were laid in 1996 through the Shanghai Five mechanism, comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The original objective was relatively modest, focusing on confidence-building, reducing military tensions and maintaining stability along shared borders following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The admission of Uzbekistan in 2001 transformed this arrangement into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Its formal establishment on June 15 that year, followed by the signing of the SCO Charter in 2002 and its entry into force in 2003, provided an institutional foundation for wider cooperation. The organisation gradually expanded its mandate to address terrorism, separatism and extremism, commonly described as its three evils.

One of its most important developments was the establishment of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), headquartered in Tashkent. It provided a permanent mechanism for exchanging information, coordinating counterterrorism efforts and facilitating cooperation among national security authorities.

The organisation subsequently expanded with the admission of India and Pakistan as full members in 2017, followed by Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024. With ten members, the SCO now connects major Eurasian powers with countries occupying important geographical positions between South Asia, Central Asia and Eastern Europe.

Its geographical and demographic reach is considerable. With an estimated population of 3.47 billion, the organisation represents approximately 42 per cent of humanity. However, its members have vastly different economic capabilities and political interests, making consensus difficult on several sensitive questions.

The SCO is neither a military alliance nor an economic union, and its consensus-based decision-making often limits its ability to respond decisively when members disagree. Nevertheless, it has maintained an institutional platform for cooperation across a region where geopolitical differences frequently complicate diplomatic engagement.

Its evolution is evident from the Peace Mission military exercise conducted in Russia’s Chelyabinsk region in August 2007. Approximately 6,000 troops from all six member states participated, alongside more than 1,000 military vehicles and equipment units. The exercise demonstrated how an organisation originally created around border confidence-building had developed the capacity for multinational security cooperation.\

Nearly two decades later, the nature of that cooperation is changing. The challenge now extends beyond territorial security to digital networks, artificial intelligence and threats that can cross national boundaries without physical movement.

Why Central Asia Matters to India’s Security and Connectivity

India’s engagement with the SCO is shaped by geographical realities as much as diplomatic considerations. Central Asia occupies an important position between South Asia, West Asia, Russia and China, making developments in the region consequential for India’s energy security and continental connectivity.

Instability in Afghanistan, the movement of extremist networks and narcotics trafficking can have implications extending well beyond Central Asia. However, India’s geographical constraints have historically restricted its direct economic access to the region, making institutional engagement an important instrument of its continental outreach.

SCO membership provides New Delhi with a regular diplomatic channel to engage Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan while maintaining contact with Russia, China and Iran. Remaining outside the organisation would have considerably reduced India’s ability to participate in discussions affecting the regional security and economic environment.

Since becoming a full member in 2017, India has attempted to establish an independent agenda within the grouping. Its presidency in 2022–23 demonstrated this ambition through approximately 134 events, including 14 ministerial-level meetings. Its initiatives covered digital inclusion, traditional medicine, innovation and cultural cooperation, reflecting an effort to broaden the organisation’s agenda beyond its traditional security concerns.

At the 26th SCO Summit in Bishkek in August–September 2026, Prime Minister Narendra Modi called for the organisation to move beyond its established tradition of dialogue and deliver tangible outcomes. He reiterated India’s vision of Security, Connectivity and Opportunity as the three principal pillars of its engagement.

The Samarkand dialogue complements this approach by bringing emerging technological threats into the centre of regional security discussions. For India, stronger cooperation on counterterrorism can contribute to a more stable regional environment, which is essential for expanding its economic and diplomatic engagement.

The International North-South Transport Corridor and India’s partnership with Iran through Chabahar port offer alternative routes towards Central Asian markets. However, transport infrastructure cannot achieve its full potential without a stable security environment. Extremist networks, insecure borders and organised criminal activities can undermine commercial confidence and disrupt regional connectivity.

India must therefore approach Central Asia through a broader framework that combines security cooperation with economic engagement. The region’s governments are interested in diversifying their external partnerships, creating opportunities for India to strengthen its presence through trade, technology and institutional cooperation.

The Digital Frontline and India’s Counterterrorism Priorities

The most immediate significance of the Samarkand dialogue lies in its examination of how technology is transforming terrorist activities. Extremist organisations are no longer dependent exclusively on physical networks or territorial bases. Digital platforms have become important instruments for recruitment, radicalisation, propaganda, fundraising and communication, allowing extremist narratives to reach audiences across national boundaries.

Artificial intelligence makes this challenge more difficult. Deepfakes can manipulate public opinion, synthetic identities can conceal the individuals behind online activities, and automated propaganda can circulate extremist material at considerable speed. Encrypted communication and digital financial transactions further complicate the identification of networks and investigation of their activities.

India’s experience in confronting cross-border terrorism makes these discussions directly relevant to its national security priorities. New Delhi should use the SCO Plus format to advocate more structured cooperation in intelligence-sharing, technological capacity-building and the investigation of cyber-enabled terrorist activities.

An important area would be the exchange of information concerning terrorist organisations, their recruitment methods, financing networks and cross-border connections. Greater cooperation among technical specialists could also help participating countries identify coordinated online radicalisation and develop more effective responses to AI-generated extremist content.

However, technological cooperation must be accompanied by a common understanding of the political nature of terrorism. India has consistently argued that there should be no distinction between terrorist organisations based on their geographical origin or political convenience. This principle deserves particular emphasis within the SCO, where member states do not always share identical perceptions of security threats.

A regional counterterrorism framework cannot become effective if political considerations determine which extremist organisations receive attention and which are overlooked. Selective condemnation weakens cooperation and creates opportunities for terrorist networks to exploit differences among governments.

For countries confronting terrorism, cooperation is not an abstract diplomatic achievement. It can mean identifying a threat before another community pays the price. That responsibility should remain central to the SCO’s emerging technological security agenda.

Managing Differences Without Surrendering India’s Interests

India’s participation in the SCO also requires careful navigation of its complicated internal dynamics. China is a founding member with considerable economic and diplomatic influence across Central Asia, while Pakistan became a full member alongside India in 2017. Their presence brings longstanding bilateral disagreements into an organisation whose decisions frequently require consensus.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through territory claimed by India, illustrates the difficulty of reconciling regional infrastructure ambitions with India’s sovereignty concerns. Differences over cross-border terrorism and regional connectivity further complicate the organisation’s ability to develop common positions.

China’s economic relationships with Central Asian countries also give Beijing considerable influence over regional priorities. India must recognise that participation alone does not guarantee influence, particularly when its interests diverge from those of more powerful members.

Nevertheless, these differences should not become a reason for disengagement. India must cooperate where interests converge, defend its national positions where they diverge and avoid allowing bilateral disagreements to undermine opportunities for mutually beneficial regional engagement.

Its approach should remain pragmatic and consistent. The SCO’s value to India does not depend on complete political alignment with its members, but on its ability to provide access to a regional platform where Indian interests can be articulated and partnerships developed.

From Samarkand’s Declarations to Practical Cooperation

The Joint Communiqué adopted in Samarkand provides a starting point for future cooperation, but its effectiveness will depend on implementation. Proposals for research into emerging technologies, preventive practices and professional training must gradually translate into tangible institutional outcomes.

India should encourage closer coordination between the SCO Plus dialogue and the existing Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. RATS already provides an established mechanism for counterterrorism cooperation, and greater interaction between intelligence professionals, security experts and technology specialists could connect discussions with practical requirements.

Another priority should be developing regional capabilities to identify AI-enabled extremist propaganda, investigate cyberterrorism and address the misuse of digital financial systems. India’s experience in digital public infrastructure and technology-led service delivery could contribute to these discussions through knowledge-sharing and technical cooperation.

Cooperation should also extend to narcotics trafficking and organised crime, given the connections between illicit financial networks and regional instability. Universities and research institutions should participate more actively, as understanding emerging technological threats requires expertise beyond conventional security agencies.

At the same time, India should resist the creation of additional institutional mechanisms without clearly defined responsibilities. The emphasis must remain on practical cooperation and measurable outcomes rather than an expanding collection of declarations and dialogue platforms. Any regional arrangement must also respect legitimate privacy concerns and the legal safeguards governing the use of digital information.

The SCO’s Next Quarter-Century and India’s Opportunity

The first SCO Plus Expert Dialogue comes at an important moment as the organisation marks its 25th anniversary in 2026. Its first quarter-century established an institutional framework for cooperation across a geographically extensive and politically diverse region. Its next phase must demonstrate whether that framework can adapt to a security environment shaped by artificial intelligence and transnational threats.

For India, the opportunity is considerable, although expectations must remain realistic. The SCO cannot resolve every geopolitical disagreement or guarantee uniform cooperation among countries with different political and security priorities. Nor should India’s engagement be measured simply by the number of meetings it attends or declarations it endorses.

Its influence will depend on its ability to translate diplomatic participation into stronger regional partnerships, useful intelligence cooperation and practical technological collaboration. India’s counterterrorism experience, diplomatic reach and technological capabilities give it the opportunity to make a meaningful contribution to this process.

Behind the language of intelligence-sharing and technological cooperation lies a simple responsibility of ensuring that the next generation inherits a safer neighbourhood than the one confronting it today.

The SCO began as an effort to reduce tensions along the borders of a region unsettled by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Twenty-five years later, its members face threats that operate beyond territorial boundaries and demand a different kind of regional response. The Samarkand dialogue has opened an important conversation about that challenge. For New Delhi, the opportunity lies in ensuring that its participation helps turn this conversation into lasting cooperation and a more influential Indian presence across Eurasia.