From Hormuz to 6G: Inside the Quad’s Expanding Strategic Agenda

In an era shaped by fractured supply chains, technological rivalry, maritime contestation and economic uncertainty, countries are increasingly gravitating towards frameworks that can adapt quickly and produce tangible outcomes. The New Delhi meeting has shown that the Quad is acutely aware of this shifting landscape. The real challenge now lies in whether the grouping can sustain momentum, translate ambition into durable cooperation, and remain effective as geopolitical pressures deepen across the Indo-Pacific.

When shipping routes close, energy prices rise. When supply chains fracture, ordinary livelihoods feel the shock. The Quad’s deliberations in New Delhi unfolded against such interconnected vulnerabilities, where disruptions in one corner of the Indo-Pacific now ripple across factories, fuel markets and digital networks worldwide.

The 11th Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in New Delhi on May 26 signalled how rapidly the grouping is evolving from a strategic dialogue into a practical coordination platform with growing influence over the Indo-Pacific’s future. Chaired by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, the meeting brought together U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong and Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi. The ministers also met Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the visit.

Today, Indo-Pacific sits at the heart of global commerce, technological competition and maritime geopolitics. Nearly 60% of global maritime trade and a substantial share of world energy flows pass through these waters. Any instability in the region can quickly become a global economic problem. As the Indo-Pacific becomes the centre of gravity of global affairs, the Quad’s expanding responsibilities may become harder for the world to ignore.

From Strategic Signalling to Delivery on the Ground

If the twentieth century revolved around oil fields and ideological blocs, the twenty-first is increasingly revolving around supply chains, sea lanes and digital standards. The Quad’s New Delhi meeting reflected that changing reality with unusual clarity.

Over the years, critics often questioned whether the Quad was merely a loose diplomatic arrangement designed to issue joint statements about regional stability. The New Delhi meeting suggested something more concrete is emerging. The grouping increasingly appears focused on delivering practical public goods across maritime governance, energy security, disaster relief, infrastructure and resilient supply chains.

The Quad countries together account for roughly a quarter of global GDP, represent nearly 1.9 billion people and include four major naval powers spread across the Indo-Pacific. Yet the grouping still avoids the rigid architecture of a treaty alliance. India’s approach has consistently favoured a practical and non-alliance framework centred on maritime security, technology, connectivity and economic resilience rather than overt military balancing, and this flexibility explains the Quad’s durability. 

Unlike formal alliances, the grouping allows its members to cooperate deeply even when their strategic compulsions differ. India values strategic autonomy. Australia maintains major economic ties with China. Japan operates within long-standing constitutional and security constraints. American domestic priorities can shift sharply across administrations. Even so, the Quad continues expanding.

History rarely rewards static coalitions. The Quad’s relevance depends on its ability to adapt, which is a lesson as old as statecraft itself.

Maritime Security Moves to the Centre

A major outcome of the meeting was the launch of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration initiative. The initiative aims to strengthen information-sharing, maritime domain awareness and surveillance cooperation among the four countries, initially focusing on the Indian Ocean Region through expert exchanges and tabletop exercises.

The maritime dimension dominated much of the discussion in New Delhi because the Indo-Pacific’s strategic reality is fundamentally maritime. Sea lanes carry energy shipments, digital connectivity, commercial goods and military deployments simultaneously. The Quad’s maritime agenda increasingly resembles a regional public-goods model focused on capacity-building, governance support and information-sharing alongside deterrence.

The ministers also reviewed progress under the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness. The four countries are now developing a comprehensive Common Operating Picture that seeks to harness real-time maritime information across Indo-Pacific waters. India will host the next Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission to strengthen interoperability and address unlawful maritime activities.

India’s growing role within this framework has become fairly visible. The meeting welcomed New Delhi’s operationalisation of the Indian Ocean Region programme under the Quad IPMDA framework through the Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region in Gurugram. The ministers reiterated support for free and unimpeded maritime commerce and emphasised adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Concerns over maritime disruptions cast a long shadow over discussions on the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, two arteries through which global commerce and energy lifelines flow. The ministers condemned attacks on commercial shipping and opposed measures inconsistent with international maritime law, including the imposition of tolls. The unease was grounded in lived experience rather than diplomatic abstraction. Instability in West Asia has repeatedly exposed the fragility of global supply chains, where disruptions at critical chokepoints can trigger fuel price volatility, delay cargo movements and send economic aftershocks far beyond the region.

Critical Minerals, Chips and the Politics of Supply Chains

One of the most consequential outcomes of the meeting involved critical minerals and economic resilience. The ministers announced the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative Framework aimed at strengthening supply chains across mining, processing and recycling. On the sidelines, Jaishankar and Rubio also signed the India-U.S. Critical Minerals Framework.

The strategic significance of such cooperation becomes clearer when viewed through recent history. In 2010, amid tensions with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, China reportedly restricted rare-earth exports to Japan. That episode transformed critical minerals from a technical economic issue into a geopolitical concern. Countries across the Indo-Pacific increasingly realised how concentrated control over industrial inputs could be used as leverage.

Rubio highlighted precisely this concern while explaining the rationale behind the India-U.S. agreement. He argued that modern industries should not remain dependent on single-source monopolies capable of shaping geopolitical outcomes. The agreement also builds upon discussions held at the Critical Minerals Forum in Washington and gained momentum after India joined Pax Silica.

The semiconductor crisis between 2020 and 2022 offered another lesson. Automobile manufacturing slowed across continents. Consumer electronics faced shortages. Industrial production suffered repeated disruptions. The crisis exposed how technological supply chains had become inseparable from national security and economic stability.

That memory continues to shape the Quad’s broader technology agenda. The ministers reviewed cooperation on Open Radio Access Networks in Palau, where trusted suppliers were selected earlier this year to support secure 4G and 5G connectivity. Discussions also advanced collaboration on 6G standards and digital identity interoperability.

Undersea cable protection emerged as another major priority. More than 95% of global intercontinental digital data flows through undersea cables. A single disruption can affect banking systems, communications, digital commerce and state operations simultaneously. The Quad partners are now working to ensure all Pacific Islands Forum countries are connected through undersea cable networks by 2026.

Infrastructure and the Pacific Push

Infrastructure and connectivity formed another important pillar of the New Delhi discussions. Building upon the Quad Ports of the Future Partnership conference hosted in India last year, the grouping announced plans to work with Fiji on port infrastructure and related activities. It marks the first joint Quad port project.

The significance of such initiatives cannot be understood without recalling Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port experience. Following mounting debt distress, the port was leased to a Chinese company for 99 years in 2017. The episode sharpened debates across the Indo-Pacific over sovereignty, infrastructure financing and strategic dependence. It also pushed countries to seek alternatives that emphasise transparency and long-term sustainability.

Describing the project as the Quad’s strongest commitment yet to the Pacific region, Miinster Wong highlighted the importance of giving countries meaningful development choices amid worsening strategic uncertainty and energy insecurity.

Energy cooperation also received major attention. The ministers launched the Quad Initiative on Indo-Pacific Energy Security to expand collaboration in technology, market analysis, emergency response and energy management. Quad partners are already providing technological and financial support exceeding USD 25 million across Indo-Pacific energy technology supply chains.

The discussions extended beyond economics. Health preparedness and humanitarian assistance featured prominently, with the grouping noting that health training and emergency preparedness programmes across the Indo-Pacific now exceed USD 50 million in value. The 2025 tabletop exercise and Strategic Working Group meeting in Honolulu were cited as important steps toward improving coordinated disaster response.

Counter-Terrorism and the Wider Strategic Picture

Counter-terrorism remained another key area of convergence. The Quad condemned terrorism in all forms, including cross-border terrorism, and reaffirmed a policy of zero tolerance toward terrorist threats. The ministers specifically denounced the Pahalgam terror attack in India on April 22, 2025, and the Bondi Beach attack in Australia in December last year.

India’s hosting of two Quad counter-terrorism workshops in September 2025, focusing on drones and emerging technologies, was highlighted during the meeting. Australia will now host the Quad Counterterrorism Tabletop Exercise in June 2026, focused on state-sponsored terrorism threats and unmanned aerial systems.

MMotegi described the Quad as a vital framework rooted in shared values and strategic interests. He also reaffirmed support for the complete denuclearisation of North Korea while expressing concern over Pyongyang’s missile, nuclear and cyber activities.

Meanwhile, China reiterated its longstanding position that regional cooperation should promote peace and prosperity rather than encourage bloc confrontation or target third parties. Beijing’s concerns continue to hover over Quad discussions even when China remains unmentioned in formal language.

India’s Diplomatic Moment and the Future of the Quad

EAM Dr Jaishankar in the Quad Meeting

For India, the New Delhi meeting delivered important diplomatic dividends. It reinforced the country’s image as a central Indo-Pacific actor capable of convening major democracies while still retaining strong engagement with the Global South. Equally important, New Delhi successfully advanced priorities that align closely with its long-term strategic vision, including maritime security, resilient supply chains, critical minerals and trusted technologies.

In his remarks, Dr Jaishankar argued that the Indo-Pacific requires stronger strategic confidence, deeper collaboration and wider economic choices. His emphasis reflected India’s broader effort to shape a regional order that remains open, multipolar and less vulnerable to coercive dependencies.

If NATO became the institutional language of the Cold War, minilateral platforms like the Quad may increasingly become the defining diplomatic vocabulary of a multipolar century. The Quad’s future, however, will likely depend less on military symbolism and more on whether it can continue delivering practical outcomes across infrastructure, energy, connectivity and economic resilience.

Rather than evolving into an “Asian NATO,” the Quad is steadily becoming a multi-dimensional coordination platform built around resilience and regional capacity-building. Its institutional flexibility remains one of its greatest advantages. The grouping does not require identical threat perceptions or rigid treaty obligations to function effectively.

In an era shaped by fractured supply chains, technological rivalry, maritime contestation and economic uncertainty, countries are increasingly gravitating towards frameworks that can adapt quickly and produce tangible outcomes. The New Delhi meeting showed that the Quad is acutely aware of this shifting landscape. Yet recognition alone will not suffice. The real challenge now lies in whether the grouping can sustain momentum, translate ambition into durable cooperation, and remain effective as geopolitical pressures deepen across the Indo-Pacific.