IMEC: Greece’s Geopolitical Opportunity in the Eastern Mediterranean, Maritime Security, and Strategic Convergence with India

Commander Athanasios Drivas, Hellenic Navy, is Deputy Commander of the Hellenic Navy War College (HNWC)

By Commander Athanasios Drivas HN,

The global geo-economy is entering a phase of intensifying strategic rivalry, in which trade routes, energy flows, and digital infrastructure—including data cables—are no longer merely technical elements. Instead, they are moving to the forefront of international politics as tools of power, influence, and resilience. In today’s global environment, connectivity is no longer simply a means for economic growth but has become a vital arena for geo-economic rivalry, strategic influence, and the rebalancing of regional and international power.

In this context, the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, known as the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which was proposed by India on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September 2023, is emerging as one of the most important connectivity initiatives of this decade.

The importance of the corridor goes beyond just enabling trade. It lies in its capacity to connect maritime and land transport, port facilities, energy infrastructure, and data networks, from the Indian Ocean to the Eastern Mediterranean (East Med) and the European hinterland

The IMEC is envisioned as a transcontinental corridor roughly 6,400 km long, designed to connect the port of Mumbai with ports in the Eastern and Northern Mediterranean by integrating existing and planned transport, energy, and digital links. Its transport component is divided into three related but separate parts: firstly, the maritime link between India’s western ports and the Persian Gulf; secondly, the rail and multimodal connection of Gulf ports with the Mediterranean via Jordan and Israel; and thirdly, the maritime link from eastern Mediterranean ports to southern Europe.

However, beyond its purely transport-related role, the corridor also includes vital energy and digital components, such as renewable energy initiatives, mechanisms for coordinating energy markets, and fibre-optic networks. As a result, IMEC is not just a new trade route but a complex strategic infrastructure designed to reshape the movement of trade, energy, and data between India, the Middle East, and Europe. In doing so, it bolsters the resilience of supply chains and offers an alternative pathway of connectivity within the broader landscape of international geo-economic competition.

In this context, IMEC is an emerging connectivity framework of complex geo-economic and geostrategic importance, integrating three interconnected pillars into a single system: transportation, energy, and digital connectivity. Its primary advantage is that it goes beyond a simple freight corridor to establish a multimodal connectivity infrastructure linking India, the Middle East, and Europe, thereby improving the speed, flexibility, and resilience of supply chains. The integration of maritime and rail networks, alongside energy and digital infrastructure, can reduce transit times, lower transportation costs, and increase participating countries’ access to international markets.

At the same time, the strategic significance of IMEC is even broader. The corridor is part of the broader competition for control over infrastructure, transport routes, energy networks, and digital systems in the Eurasian region. From this perspective, it is not merely an economic venture but also an expression of a rules-based framework of open connectivity, presented as an alternative to geo-economic schemes dominated by a single power, the most notable example being China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Consequently, IMEC is emerging not only as a new corridor linking India, the Middle East, and Europe, but also as an alternative—and, to some extent, competitive—route for goods, energy, and data vis-à-vis the Chinese connectivity architecture.

The Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI, is the major transnational connectivity initiative announced by China in 2013, with the aim of strengthening its trade, transport, energy, and broader economic ties with Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. The concept rests on two pillars: the land-based “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the maritime “21st Century Maritime Silk Road.”

In this context, the IMEC initiative aims to present an alternative model of connectivity based on multilateral partnerships, diversification of supply chains, and reduced reliance on networks controlled by or heavily influenced by a single superpower. This development clarifies why IMEC should not be seen simply as a technical infrastructure project, but as a geo-economic and geopolitical response to an international environment of shifting power dynamics.

IMEC Strategic Theory

The main point of this article is that IMEC cannot be properly evaluated either as a straightforward transport project or as a typical alternative to the Suez route. Its success mainly depends on maritime security, political stability, institutional predictability, and crisis management capability. Without these factors, investor confidence cannot be established, and the risk costs remain high. From a strategic economic perspective, the absence of conflicts along the IMEC route is crucial for attracting capital, maintaining supply flows, and managing a complex corridor without significant fluctuations in costs and time.

The Atlantic Council study views the IMEC as a multi-layered structure operating amid geopolitical uncertainty, rather than as a narrowly defined commercial project. It highlights the interdependence of transport, energy, and digital sectors. It also stresses that the corridor’s success depends on political coordination, financial backing, regulatory alignment, and effective risk mitigation strategies. Similarly, the analysis by the think tank Chintan Research Foundation (CRF) in New Delhi provides a more realistic operational outlook, noting that despite initial political enthusiasm, the IMEC remains a work in progress, with significant issues concerning maturity, governance, and implementation

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The strategic conclusion for Greece is that the network of states linked to IMEC is not merely an “economic alliance” in which declaring participation alone suffices. Instead, it is a complex political-economic endeavour in which each country's position depends on its capacity to provide reliability, functionality, and security.

For Greece, this means that the country’s role cannot be based solely on geography or on general rhetoric about being a “gateway to the European Union” but rather requires proven state capacity, synergy between port and land infrastructure, and, above all, strategic consistency and continuity.

In this context, the maritime aspect of IMEC is crucial. Although the focus often falls on land and rail components, the corridor is primarily a maritime multimodal route. Flows from India to the Gulf and onwards to the Eastern Mediterranean and Europe depend on secure maritime communication lines, efficient port operations, and stability in high-risk zones. Even minor disruptions can increase insurance costs, cause route adjustments, extend delivery times, and ultimately reduce the corridor’s reliability, especially where investment decisions are made.

This is exactly where the vital role of security as a fundamental requirement for investment becomes clear. IMEC infrastructure, such as ports, railways, energy networks, digital hubs, and cables, is long-term, high-cost, and requires significant capital. This is not infrastructure that can be easily moved or replaced if the security situation worsens. Because of this, stability is more important than development. Without a secure environment, the cost of risk rises, insurance premiums increase, funding gets delayed, and ultimately, the operational reliability of the corridor is compromised. The message is clear: implementing large-scale investments depends heavily on a secure, stable strategic environment.

The connection between security and prosperity is also shown in official Euro-Atlantic documents. NATO’s Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) reaffirms naval power as central to deterrence, collective defence, and crisis management, focusing on constant readiness, maritime situational awareness, and safeguarding maritime communication routes and critical infrastructure.

Accordingly, the revised European Maritime Safety Strategy and the action plan on the safety of underwater cables emphasise resilience, surveillance, protection of undersea infrastructure, and rapid restoration capability as key aspects of European security.  By this logic, the energy and digital dimensions of IMEC are not secondary but an organic part of its strategic importance.

Geopolitical opportunity for Greece

The Greek aspect of IMEC holds particular strategic importance, as Greece is not just the western end of an interconnection corridor but also has the potential to become a key European hub within its broader framework. Its location at the western edge of the Eastern Mediterranean, its historic maritime strength, its membership in the European Union (EU) and NATO, and its growing role in regional security and energy all add to its strategic significance.

In this context, Greece's contribution to IMEC is more than simply acting as a gateway to the European market. It also has the capacity to serve as a secure, reliable, and efficient terminal hub that connects trade, energy, and data flows to the European hinterland. Therefore, Greece's role in IMEC extends beyond geographical considerations and assumes broader geo-economic and geopolitical significance. The key issue for Greece's accession to the IMEC is not just having a large port, but ensuring the entire Greek segment of the corridor functions well. While Greece aims to use its strategic location as a natural gateway to Southeast Europe, the real challenge is to integrate port infrastructure, rail links, and efficient transit management into a single, dependable, and operational system.

Even ports with clear technical advantages, like Piraeus, face geopolitical restrictions due to Chinese involvement. Other Greek options, such as Thessaloniki and Eleusis, either encounter political challenges or are not yet fully developed. This shifts the focus from asking "which port" to a more important question: "How effective is the entire national infrastructure supporting the corridor?"

Therefore, as Greece aims to turn its geographic location into a lasting geopolitical advantage, it is essential to manage the port, hinterland, transport links, customs procedures, and Digital Interoperability as a unified system of strategic efficiency. In particular, the rail link connecting the ports to Central Europe is the most vital factor because, without it, Greek involvement risks remaining merely a geographical possibility rather than having a full operational impact.

At the heart of this strategy is the Greek-Indian relationship, which now extends beyond merely bilateral trade. India seeks secure and politically reliable access routes to the European market, while Greece aims to establish itself as a highly trustworthy hub for trade, energy, and services entering Europe. The meeting[1] between Greek Prime Minister (PM) Mr Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Indian PM Mr Narendra Modi on 19 February 2026 confirmed this trend, with Greece highlighting defence, shipping, shipbuilding and ship repair, infrastructure, and connectivity as essential areas for strengthening cooperation. Greece also emphasised its potential to serve as India's gateway to Europe and to actively participate in IMEC.

Similarly, the Indian side confirmed that the two leaders reviewed the entire strategic partnership, expressed appreciation for recent connectivity initiatives, and recognised the potential for further development of these initiatives within the framework of IMEC. In this context, the Greek-Indian relationship is likely to evolve into a strategic connection between India and Europe, through a framework that integrates trade, infrastructure, security, and geopolitical alignment.

Greece's geopolitical position under IMEC is significantly strengthened by US support. The Atlantic Council's analysis views the corridor as a framework for regional integration, which aligns with broader U.S. aims of stability, connectivity, and diversifying vital networks. For Greece, this development presents an important opportunity to align geopolitical and geo-economic interests, but it does not create a strategic impact on its own. U.S. involvement can provide political depth and lessen investment uncertainty only if Greece can unify its infrastructure, security, and diplomacy into a cohesive national strategy.

In the same direction, recent articles of Kathimerini offer a useful interpretative framework for the Greek dimension of IMEC. Konstantinos Filis, in the article "Energy cooperative and geopolitics", argues that the energy cooperation between Greece and the USA, the Vertical Gas Corridor (VGC) and Chevron's activities in Greece do not automatically reverse the regional correlations in the East Med. Instead, they reflect a gradual geopolitical upgrade of Greece, boosting its usefulness to the West as a hub for the entry, regasification, and transit of natural gas to Central and Eastern Europe. The key point of the analysis is that the value of these developments lies not in a direct shift in regional balances but in the creation of a broader network of interests, which increases Greece's strategic relevance. The same logic applies to IMEC, which gains significant strategic importance only when integrated into stable structures of interest, protection, and lasting strategic utility.

Moreover, Kathimerini's article on U.S. pressure on the European Union (EU) highlights that the vertical Gas Corridor is no longer viewed as a mere energy infrastructure, but as a critical mechanism for the entry and transit of U.S. LNG to Southeast and Central Europe. In the context of Europe's intended full dependence on Russian gas by 2027, Greece is projected to be a regional energy hub, whose value stems from its geographical location, existing infrastructure, and ability to integrate into broader energy supply corridors. The essential point is that US support is not limited to political declarations but also includes specific demands to strengthen infrastructure, remove regulatory barriers, and make new investments, including additional projects in Bulgaria and Romania and a second floating regasification station in Greece.

Finally, a related article in Kathimerini adds the critical regional dimension to the analysis of IMEC. The new alliances being formed in the East Med and the wider region, from the Middle East to India, demonstrate that the corridor is not developing in a geopolitical vacuum but rather within a new environment of strategic convergences and antagonisms. The deepening of ties between India and Israel, the participation of American, Arab, and European powers in relevant processes, and the establishment of alternative axes of connectivity to competing actors are signs of a broader power redeployment. From this perspective, IMEC appears not merely as a commercial or transport corridor, but as a component of an emerging architecture of connectivity, security and political convergence.

In this context, India's role holds particular significance for Greece. India now presents itself not only as a major Asian partner but also as a strategic actor seeking secure and politically reliable access routes to Europe. Greece appears as the Mediterranean link, capable of providing a European finishing touch, maritime expertise, institutional stability, and connections to the EU's hinterland. Therefore, the Greek-Indian relationship gives IMEC a stronger strategic dimension, as it links India's pursuit of access with Greece's aim of geo-economic and geopolitical progress. For Greece, this means that its role in the corridor becomes even more vital, as the country functions not merely as a transit point but as a dependable European partner for India and a provider of security, energy, and political stability at the Mediterranean end of IMEC.

India's significance to IMEC becomes even more critical amid the recent regional crisis in the Middle East. New Delhi perceives the developments not as a distant regional issue but as a direct influence on its energy security, maritime transport, and broader strategic environment, since a large portion of its energy imports are connected to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. In this context, India aims to maintain operational relations with all major regional players while bolstering alternative, more resilient routes to Europe[1]. In this sense, IMEC gains not only economic significance for India but also broader strategic importance, acting as a framework for diversification, predictability, and strengthening the resilience of its international links.

Regional Crisis: Persian Gulf

The regional crisis that unfolded on 28 February 2026, involving escalated military actions between the US, Israel, and Iran, shows that IMEC should not be viewed merely as a neutral technical or commercial project but as a geo-economic and geostrategic infrastructure. Its viability depends on the stability of the broader regional security framework. The tension stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean, the potential for the crisis to spill over into multiple power domains, threats to maritime communication lines, and the rising use of missile and unmanned systems have significantly impacted the strategic environment in which IMEC will operate.

Tellingly, after operations began, the number of tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz was significantly reduced and, by 5 March 2026, had nearly come to a complete halt, confirming the vulnerability of global energy and trade flows. Under these conditions, IMEC's operational and financial credibility depends not only on investing in Port, Rail, and Energy Interconnections but also on establishing a clear framework for deterrence, maritime security, critical infrastructure protection, and civil-military resilience.

In this context, Greece becomes more strategically important for IMEC, as it utilises its geographical location, credible alliances, and growing security capabilities at the western tip of the Eastern Mediterranean. Strengthening Greece's strategic position from northern Greece and Souda to the southeastern boundary of the Greek and Cypriot region enhances the nation's role not only as a transit gateway to the European market but also as an operational and geopolitical centre of stability that facilitates flows passing through the corridor.

At the same time, reactions to the changing power dynamics in the East Med reveal that Greek geography is becoming more significant in regional matters, and emphasise Greece's role as a secure connection between the Middle East and Europe. The success of IMEC will therefore depend not only on its economic results but also on the participating states' capacity to establish it within a stable framework of deterrence, maritime strength, and institutionally organised regional security.

CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS

IMEC is more than just a transit project for Greece; it is a complex strategic arena where geoeconomics, maritime security, energy policy, and regional power dynamics intersect. Greek involvement in this corridor is particularly significant, as it depends on the country's ability to act as a stable, predictable, and institutionally reliable hub in the East Med. While Greece's geographical position provides a key advantage, this benefit only reaches its full strategic potential when supported by infrastructure resilience, administrative effectiveness, and consistent national policies.

The escalation of the crisis in the Middle East since 28 February 2026 has clearly highlighted the vulnerability of maritime communication routes and energy flows from the Persian Gulf to the East Med. This has emphasised the importance of dependable connectivity frameworks for Europe, centred on secure sea paths, stable hubs, and predictable institutional partners. For India in particular, this significance becomes even greater as access to European markets increasingly depends on maintaining alternative and resilient transport, energy, and trade routes. Within this context, Greece enhances its strategic value by positioning itself not only as a European gateway but also as a Mediterranean hub of stability, security, and administrative continuity.

The key conclusion is that regional security takes precedence over investment, and IMEC functionality takes priority over rhetoric. Consequently, planning for this geo-economic corridor must account not only for economic and technical indicators but also for a realistic evaluation of the strategic security environment. In this context, Greece's credibility will be assessed not only by its willingness to participate in the corridor but, more importantly, by its ability to ensure secure flows, protect critical infrastructure, maintain institutional stability, and remain operationally ready amid heightened uncertainty.

The first priority is to establish a unified national framework for Greece's involvement in IMEC. Such a framework becomes vital when it links ports, rail connections, energy facilities, digital infrastructure, customs procedures, and critical infrastructure protection within a cohesive national action system. In this context, shifting from a focus on individual ports to an integrated national transit and connectivity system is particularly crucial. Simultaneously, the necessity to enhance maritime surveillance, cybersecurity, and underwater infrastructure protection is reinforced, ensuring that Greek territory serves not only as a transit corridor but also as a secure and resilient space.

The second priority is to strengthen the strategic partnership with India and utilise American support to achieve tangible outcomes. The strategic aspect of the Greek-Indian relationship extends beyond trade and includes infrastructure, energy, technology, and security. Likewise, U.S. support becomes more significant when connected to investments, technological collaboration, infrastructure improvements, and Greece's deeper integration into the stability and connectivity networks of the East Med. In this way, Greek involvement in IMEC shifts from a theoretical geopolitical possibility to a tangible advantage with operational and financial benefits.

The third priority is Greece's role within the broader network of partnerships linking the East Med with Cyprus, Israel, the United States, and India. IMEC becomes truly strategic when seen as part of a regional framework in which Infrastructure, Energy, Deterrence, and Political Credibility support one another. As long as Greece continues to invest in institutional stability, transnational cooperation, and strategic transparency, it can develop not just as a transit point but as a secure, stable, and indispensable European hub for IMEC in the East Med.

About the Author.

Commander Athanasios Drivas, Hellenic Navy, is Deputy Commander of the Hellenic Navy War College (HNWC), having served in surface units and in staff positions at the Hellenic Naval Academy (HNA), the Hellenic Navy General Staff (HNGS), the Hellenic Fleet H.Q Ops Centre, the Hellenic National Defence General Staff (HNDGS) and NATO (NCIA JFC Naples). He is a graduate of the Hellenic Naval Academy (Class 1999), the Hellenic Naval War College, the Supreme Joint War College (SJWC), and the 10th Training Series of the International School of Strategic Studies of the Hellenic National Defence College. He holds an MSc in Electrical Engineering with Distinction from the Naval Postgraduate School in the U.S. and is currently a scholarship student in the MA Applied Strategy and International Security program at the University of Plymouth. He has many years of teaching experience at the Hellenic Naval Academy (HNA) and the PALASKAS Training Centre, and has published works on naval operations, WECDIS electronic nautical chart systems, information security, and StratCom.

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this article are personal and do not bind the Hellenic Navy General Staff (HNGS), nor do they reflect its policy or decisions.

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