Defence, Diplomacy and Deterrence: Ajit Doval's Vietnam Visit and the New India–Vietnam Security Equation

As India and Vietnam approach 55 years of diplomatic relations in 2027, their relationship has an opportunity to acquire greater substance in a rather uncertain Indo-Pacific. Doval’s visit indicated that both governments recognise the importance of expanding cooperation into areas where intelligence, technological capabilities and institutional trust are becoming central to national security.

At Quan Su Pagoda, history offered a subtle reminder of an old friendship, even as conversations elsewhere in Hanoi reflected the growing uncertainties of a changing regional order. National Security Adviser Ajit Doval’s visit to Vietnam on November 1–2, 2026, brought these two dimensions of the India–Vietnam relationship into sharper focus, with discussions extending beyond conventional defence cooperation to intelligence sharing, cybersecurity and the protection of sensitive information.

The visit was significant because both countries are looking to strengthen cooperation in areas that directly influence their national security. As China’s military presence expands across the Indo-Pacific and geopolitical uncertainties intensify, New Delhi and Hanoi have greater reasons and responsibilities to improve their ability to exchange information and coordinate responses to protect their mutual interests. Their growing engagement also reflects a shared preference for maintaining foreign policy independence while developing closer relationships with trusted partners.

An Old Friendship Acquiring a New Direction

India and Vietnam share civilisational connections extending back more than 2,000 years, with Buddhism providing an important foundation for their historical relationship. Doval’s visit to Quan Su Pagoda, which houses the headquarters of the National Vietnam Buddhist Sangha, offered a reminder of these enduring links. However, contemporary relations are largely being shaped by economic interests and the changing security environment in Southeast Asia.

The two countries will commemorate the 55th anniversary of diplomatic relations in 2027, by which time their partnership will have acquired considerably greater institutional depth. A major development came during Vietnamese President To Lam’s visit to New Delhi in May 2026, when both countries elevated their relationship to an Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The upgraded framework provides greater scope for cooperation in defence, maritime security, intelligence exchanges and emerging technologies.

The economic relationship has also expanded alongside political engagement. Bilateral merchandise trade reached USD 18.28 billion in FY2025–26, registering year-on-year growth of an incredible 15.98%. This expansion makes regional stability important to both economies, particularly given their dependence on international shipping routes and interconnected supply chains.

The diplomatic momentum continued through the fourth Deputy-Ministerial Security Dialogue, held in New Delhi on October 16, 2026. Discussions covered cybersecurity, economic security, counterterrorism and emerging technologies, providing an institutional foundation for Doval’s subsequent engagements in Hanoi. His visit also reflected the growing effort to translate the upgraded partnership into more regular cooperation between the two governments.

Intelligence Sharing Takes Centerstage

The most consequential aspect of Doval’s visit was the emerging emphasis on intelligence cooperation. His November 2 meeting with General Luong Tam Quang, Politburo Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam and Minister of Public Security, brought several proposals into focus that could give the bilateral security relationship greater institutional depth.

According to Vietnam’s Ministry of Public Security, both sides agreed to strengthen their information exchanges, including the sharing of real-time information concerning political and regional developments. Their discussions also covered international security assessments, emerging threats and non-traditional security challenges affecting their respective national interests.

The Vietnamese side also proposed exploring an agreement on the mutual protection and exchange of classified information. General Luong Tam Quang requested India’s National Security Council Secretariat, headed by Doval, to facilitate discussions with the relevant Indian agencies. Such an arrangement would require established procedures and appropriate safeguards, as cooperation involving classified information depends heavily on institutional trust and the protection of sensitive material.

It is important to distinguish between the proposal and an accomplished agreement, since no new intelligence-sharing treaty or classified-information pact was announced as having been signed during the visit. Nevertheless, the proposal indicates an interest in moving beyond conventional diplomatic exchanges towards more structured security cooperation.

The discussions also covered cooperation against transnational crime, human trafficking, money laundering, online fraud and high-technology crime. Vietnam expressed interest in expanding collaboration in artificial intelligence, digital transformation and cybersecurity incident response, while both countries agreed to strengthen existing capacity-building initiatives.

These engagements build upon several developments during 2026. India and Vietnam held their first Cyber Policy Dialogue in January, followed by their first Cybersecurity Consultation in September. Their fourth Deputy-Ministerial Security Dialogue in October further expanded discussions on digital security and emerging technologies.

Another important development is their planned co-chairmanship of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Cyber Security for the 2027–2030 cycle. This will provide a regional platform for both countries to contribute to cybersecurity cooperation while strengthening their engagement with Southeast Asian partners. For India, it also offers an opportunity to deepen its role in regional security institutions without undermining ASEAN’s centrality.

From INS Kirpan to BrahMos, the Maritime Partnership Deepens

Doval’s meeting with General Phan Van Giang, Politburo Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence, reinforced the importance of defence cooperation within the upgraded partnership. Both sides reviewed ongoing engagements, while Vietnam invited Indian defence manufacturers to participate in the Vietnam International Defence Expo scheduled for December 2026.

India’s defence engagement with Vietnam has developed through several concrete initiatives. In 2022, New Delhi extended a USD 100-million defence Line of Credit and supplied 12 high-speed guard boats to Vietnam. Two subsequent credit facilities worth USD 120 million and USD 180 million took India’s combined defence Lines of Credit to USD 400 million, reflecting its willingness to support Vietnam’s maritime capabilities.

In July 2023, India gifted the indigenously built missile corvette INS Kirpan to the Vietnamese Navy, including its weapons. The transfer was more than a ceremonial gesture, as it provided Vietnam with a capable naval platform while demonstrating India’s willingness to support a partner’s maritime security requirements. At a time when the South China Sea remains contested, the significance of that transfer is difficult to overlook.

The relationship acquired another important dimension with the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile agreement. On May 30, 2026, Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh confirmed that India had signed an agreement to supply the missile system to Vietnam. Reuters reported that the proposed deal could be worth approximately INR 6,000 crore, although its final terms and delivery schedule remain undisclosed.

For Vietnam, the agreement offers access to an advanced missile system that could strengthen its maritime deterrence. While for India, it represents another opportunity to expand defence exports and establish itself as a credible supplier of military technology in Southeast Asia. The Philippines has already procured BrahMos, while Indonesia has also entered into a purchase agreement, indicating growing regional interest in India’s defence manufacturing capabilities.

The maritime dimension is particularly important because the South China Sea carries substantial international commercial traffic. According to the US Energy Information Administration, approximately 28 million barrels of petroleum and petroleum products passed through these waters every day in 2023, accounting for 37% of global maritime petroleum shipments.

Such figures explain why developments in the region concern countries far beyond Southeast Asia. Any disruption to shipping could affect energy supplies and increase transportation costs for economies dependent on these routes. In the South China Sea, even a coast guard vessel can become a diplomatic statement, and sometimes a rather expensive one.

For India, closer maritime engagement with Vietnam supports its wider interests in maintaining freedom of navigation and an open Indo-Pacific. Cooperation in naval training and maritime domain awareness also allows both countries to strengthen their capabilities without entering a formal military alliance.

The China Factor and the Limits of Alignment

The expanding India–Vietnam security relationship cannot be understood without considering China’s growing military and maritime presence. Beijing’s expansive claims in the South China Sea overlap with Vietnam’s claims around the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, resulting in recurring tensions over maritime access and territorial sovereignty.

Vietnam has consequently sought to diversify its defence relationships while avoiding excessive dependence on any single power. Its approach, commonly described as Bamboo Diplomacy, emphasises flexibility and national independence while allowing Hanoi to maintain working relationships with competing countries.

India’s approach shares certain similarities. Strategic autonomy remains central to New Delhi’s foreign policy, even as it expands defence cooperation with countries facing common regional concerns. Both governments therefore have reasons to strengthen their relationship without allowing it to become an explicitly anti-China arrangement.

Neither New Delhi nor Hanoi publicly confirmed that China was specifically discussed during Doval’s meetings. Nevertheless, the broader regional circumstances provide an important context for understanding the expanding partnership. For Vietnam, cooperation with India offers access to defence technology and security expertise without requiring participation in a military alliance. For India, stronger engagement with Hanoi reinforces its presence in Southeast Asia and complements its Act East Policy.

The challenge for both countries will be to maintain this convergence while preserving the diplomatic flexibility that defines their respective foreign policies. Vietnam must continue managing its relationship with Beijing, given its geographical proximity and economic connections with China. India, meanwhile, must ensure that its expanding defence engagement translates into practical cooperation without creating expectations of military commitments that neither country has undertaken.

Political Trust Must Translate into Institutional Cooperation

Doval’s meetings with General Secretary and State President To Lam and Foreign Minister Le Hoai Trung demonstrated the political support underpinning the bilateral relationship. The engagements also provided an opportunity to review progress under the Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and discuss the next phase of cooperation.

It is equally important to note that political understanding alone cannot sustain a sophisticated security partnership. The proposed classified-information agreement will require negotiations over information protection and institutional responsibilities, while intelligence exchanges will depend on reliable communication channels and appropriate safeguards. Cybersecurity cooperation, similarly, will require sustained engagement between specialised agencies.

Economic cooperation also deserves greater attention. Although bilateral trade has expanded considerably, differences over market access and rules of origin remain relevant to the relationship. India has previously raised concerns over Chinese goods potentially entering its market through Vietnam while circumventing applicable rules of origin provisions under the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement. Addressing such concerns will be important if both countries intend to strengthen economic engagement alongside security cooperation.

Greater collaboration in defence manufacturing, research and development and emerging technologies could provide the partnership with a stronger economic foundation. It would also help move bilateral relations beyond defence transactions and diplomatic exchanges towards deeper industrial cooperation.

As India and Vietnam approach 55 years of diplomatic relations in 2027, their relationship has an opportunity to acquire greater substance in a rather uncertain Indo-Pacific. Doval’s visit indicated that both governments recognise the importance of expanding cooperation into areas where intelligence, technological capabilities and institutional trust are becoming central to national security. The historical friendship provides a valuable foundation, while the expanding defence relationship offers tangible evidence of their growing engagement.

At Quan Su Pagoda, the shared history of India and Vietnam was visible in a place of worship. Beyond its walls, the discussions concerned a changing regional environment in which the security of maritime routes and the protection of sensitive information carry growing importance. The friendship has endured for centuries, but the upcoming chapter will depend on how effectively both countries convert their political understanding into lasting cooperation.